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Above and beyond superstition – western herbal medicine and 
the decriminalising of placebo 
 
Abstract 
Does it work? This question lies at the very heart of the kinds of controversies that have surrounded 
complementary and alternative medicines (such as herbal medicine) in recent decades. In this paper, I argue 
that medical anthropology has played a pivotal and largely overlooked role in taking the sham out of the 
placebo effect with important implications for what it means to say a therapy or drug ‘works’. If 
pharmacologists and clinicians have corporeally located the concept of efficacy in terms of bio-availability, 
pharmacodynamics and pharmacokinetics, and herbalists in terms of a herbal revitalising of the body’s own 
vis medicatrix naturae, from the early 20th century onwards medical anthropologists (especially those who 
became interested in the ‘savage mind’) have built up an equally rigorous theory of symbolic efficacy in 
terms of narratives, symbols and a kind of cognitive homeostasis. It was precisely as a mediating link 
between the somatic and the symbolic that I suggest a decriminalised placebo effect (as opposed to 
suggestion) could emerge in the middle of the 20th century. Taking the example of St. John’s Wort, I go on to 
show how notions of symbolic efficacy, spill-over placebo efficacy and bio-efficacy co-circulate in recent 
attempts by herbalists, clinicians and pharmacologists to address the question of whether or not this herbal 
remedy ‘works’ in the treatment of depression. 
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Introduction 
There is an interesting coincidence in the history of blind assessment in medicine and that 
of medical anthropology in the early 20th century work of experimental psychologist and 
medical anthropologist William H.R. Rivers. While at Cambridge University, Rivers carried 
out pioneer work in the use of “control mixtures which have usually been wholly 
indistinguishable from those containing active substances” (cited in Kaptchuk 1998a: 419) 
when testing psychological stimulants, and while doing fieldwork in Melanesia and New 
Guinea he came to describe “the part played by suggestion in the production and cure of 
diseases among such people as the Papuans and Melanesians” (Rivers 1924: 50). Rivers 
was writing at a crucial turning point on both fronts. 
 
On the one hand, the recently formalised medical profession in Europe and America was 
coming to terms with what historian Anne Harrington (2006) has described as the “secret 
shame” of orthodox physicians who continued to actively prescribe inert bread pills 
(especially when faced with ‘problematic’ patients) while at the same time accusing quacks 
of puffing their worthless waters and tonics as ‘miracle cures’. There was something just 
not right about insisting on a rational, scientific medicine which identified biological causes 
and pathways for diseases as well as isolated chemical compounds with which to redress 
these pathologies, while at the same time using placebos “by the bushel” as Richard 
Cabot wrote in 1903 (cited in Harrington 2006: 186). Rivers was experimenting with 
psychopharmacological as compared to inert control substances at a time where the 
clinically observed positive effect that placebos could have on patients was explained in 
terms of the suggestibility of patients who were ‘tricked’ into thinking they were getting 
better when they in fact were not. 
 
On the other hand, Rivers would play his part in challenging the ‘conventional’ 
anthropological thinking of the day which was still largely organised by evolutionary logics. 
Nineteenth century anthropological classifications of peoples and races into categories of 
savages, barbarians and civilised had assumed a linear development of languages, 
religions and customs from simple to complex, and as a result the first anthropological 
reports of the “primitive medicine” and “witchdoctoring” of the ‘savages’ were mostly 
explained in terms of a child-like simplicity and immaturity which made them susceptible to 
irrational beliefs. Indeed, 19th century civilisation taxonomies were dominated by 
metaphors of a child maturing into an adult (Wahlberg 2003; 2007a). But with the advent of 
Malinowskian cultural immersion in the early part of the 20th century, of which Rivers was 
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certainly a proponent, this evolutionary account of immature peoples and primitive 
medicine would undergo a drastic recasting. 
 
In this article, I show how medical anthropology has played a key role in the development 
of concepts that inform, in very practical ways, contemporary efforts to determine whether 
or not a treatment or medicine ‘works’, especially via clinical trials. Rather than seeing 
anthropological concepts of efficacy as somehow incommensurable or in contrast to a 
biomedical efficacy (cf. Barry 2006; Kleinman 1980; Sharma 1992), I show how different 
concepts of efficacy can co-circulate in attempts to demonstrate efficacy, using herbal 
medicine as an example. I start by showing how early 20th century medical anthropologists 
came to be interested in the therapeutic role and use of symbols in ‘primitive’ healing 
rituals through an archaeological reading of classic medical anthropology texts by Rivers, 
Evans-Pritchard, Levi-Strauss and others (cf. Canguilhem 1989). In particular, I suggest 
that the development of a theory of symbolic efficacy has contributed to a decriminalisation 
of the placebo effect, by which I mean a kind of epistemological legitimisation or 
rectification (Bachelard 1984; 2001) of an effect that for long was considered to be the 
result of trickery or even outright fraud on unknowing and/or susceptible recipients. 
 
I then go on to show how, in the mid-20th century, the concept of the ‘placebo effect’ came 
to mediate symbolic and somatic concepts of therapeutic efficacy as a kind of spill-over 
effect measurable “at the end organs”. While still highly controversial, the placebo effect 
has become such an acknowledged part of almost any treatment intervention (not to 
mention a legitimate and ‘real’ object of scientific scrutiny) that ‘proving’ that a treatment or 
medicine ‘works’ today increasingly requires demonstrating an efficacy that is ‘above and 
beyond placebo’. 
 
In the final part of the article, I show how symbolic, placebo and somatic concepts of 
efficacy have informed recent efforts by herbalists, clinicians and pharmacologists alike to 
demonstrate that the herbal remedy St. John’s Wort is not a superstitious “old wives’ tale” 
but rather has an efficacy that is ‘above and beyond placebo’ in the treatment of 
depression. Importantly, however, while the randomised controlled trial works to separate 
out ‘placebo’ and other ‘non-specific’ effects as a means to quantify ‘true drug’ effect, 
herbalists actively work to keep these different forms of efficacy together in what is 
described as a “holistic” approach to healing in their practice. 
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Leechcraft and the symbolic therapeutics of coping 
Like Bronislaw Malinowski, Rivers became convinced during field visits to Melanesia that 
Melanesians were in fact highly rational and sophisticated people, a point he would make 
emphatically in Medicine, Magic, Religion: “the concepts underlying the magical procedure 
of savage man have not the vague and indefinite character often assigned to them, but 
form clear and relatively concrete motives for the complex procedures of the sorcerer and 
leech” and conversely, “the practices of these peoples in relation to disease are not a 
medley of disconnected and meaningless customs, but are inspired by definite ideas 
concerning the causation of disease”  (1924: 52, 51). As a consequence, Rivers 
consistently used the term leechcraft in place of the more evolutionarily-loaded primitive 
medicine when referring to the healing arts of the so-called “peoples of rude culture”. A few 
decades later, Erwin Ackerknecht went on to summarise this epistemological break by 
arguing that: 
 
[in the past,] students either decided that certain primitives have no medicine 
at all, because their medicine fits so badly into our pattern of medicine, or they 
regarded it only as a mere immature or degenerate variety of our medicine… 
[But,] primitive medicine is not a queer collection of errors and superstitions, 
but a number of living units in living cultural patterns, quite able to function 
through the centuries in spite of their fundamental differences from our own 
pattern” (Ackerknecht 1971: 120). 
 
Even Edward Evans-Pritchard, who suggested in his 1937 ethnography of Witchcraft, 
Oracles and Magic Among the Azande of southern Sudan that it could well be that “the 
majority of [Zande witchdoctors] are quacks”, did not account for their continuing 
prevalence by suggesting an irrationality or simplicity on the part of the Azande1: 
 
Azande do not consider what their world would be like without witch-doctors 
any more than we consider what it would be like without physicians. Since 
there is witchcraft there are naturally witch-doctors… All their beliefs hang 
together, and were a Zande to give up faith in witch-doctorhood he would have 
to surrender equally his belief in witchcraft and oracles… In this web of belief 
every strand depends upon every other strand, and a Zande cannot get out of 
its meshes because this is the only world he knows. The web is not an 
external structure in which he is enclosed. It is the texture of his thought and 
he cannot think that his thought is wrong. Nevertheless, his beliefs are not 
absolutely set but are variable and fluctuating to allow for different situations 
and to permit empirical observation and even doubts. (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 
185, 194-5) 
 
The increasing number of ethnographically detailed accounts of the medical practices of 
‘primitive peoples’ that emerged during the first half of the 20th century were more or less 
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unified in their conclusion that “in the department of his activity in which he endeavours to 
cope with disease, savage man is no illogical or prelogical creature, … his actions are 
guided by reasoning as definite as that we can claim for our own medical practices” 
(Rivers 1924: 53). But this still left anthropologists with the question of just how the 
leechcraft of the savages could ‘work’, as this, Ackerknecht argued, it quite dramatically 
did: “There are too many well testified cases in primitive tribes where magic kills by 
suggestion for the fact to be doubted. Why should the power that kills not be able to heal?” 
(Ackerknecht 1971: 130). It was common knowledge at the time that herbs and plants 
have been an important source of medicines for peoples and cultures throughout the world 
since time immemorial. But Evans-Pritchard for one was definitely not convinced that the 
efficacy of Azande healing practices could be attributed to the pharmacological properties 
of the plants used by their witchdoctors and healers: 
 
The assumption that Azande would hardly have continued to use drugs for 
centuries if they possessed no curative properties… is unhappily contradicted 
by the history of European medicine and by the history of magic everywhere 
and at all times. The enormous number of drugs which Azande employ and 
the variety of herbal products they bring to bear on a single disease at once 
demonstrate their lack of therapeutic value when we reflect what scientific 
pharmacology really implies. (Evans-Pritchard 1937: 494) 
 
Not everyone was in full agreement with Evans-Pritchard on this point however, as, for 
example, Ackerknecht argued that “an enormous number of effective drugs is known to the 
primitives… [f]rom twenty-five to fifty percent of their pharmacopoeia is often found to be 
objectively active” (1971: 128). Nevertheless, there was broad agreement in 
anthropological debates that the efficacy of leechcraft could not be accounted for by the 
medicinal plants used in healing practices alone. 
 
Instead, medical anthropologists began building up a theory of symbolic efficacy to 
account for the healing effects of leechcraft. The concept of ‘coping’ has been and indeed 
remains central to medical anthropology (which takes human subjectivity as its object), as 
central as the concept of ‘regulation’ has been to biomedicine (which takes the anatomical 
body as its object) (Canguilhem 1988). It was Rivers who initially suggested that the 
leechcraft of ‘savages’ should be understood in terms of their “endeavours to cope with 
disease”, and that among the Papuans and Melanesians: 
 
we can see clearly that most of the processes by which disease was thought 
to be produced and was treated are such as would act through the mind. The 
manifold lines of treatment by which human or spiritual agents were induced to 
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cure disease acted, if they were successful, through the agency of faith and 
suggestion. (Rivers 1924: 122) 
 
Importantly, he did not view these processes as necessarily fraudulent, but argued instead 
that “there is reason to believe that [the sorcerer or priest] is not wholly a deceiver, but in 
some measure shares the general belief in his own powers… I believe that, in many 
cases, it is the same among ourselves, and that a study of our own quacks and charlatans, 
with that amount of care which we devote to the Australian or the Melanesian leech, would 
show us the impostor far less than is usually supposed” (Rivers 1924: 50-1). 
 
So how did faith and suggestion work in the leeches’ endeavours to assist their patients to 
cope with their diseases, and thereby to elicit cures? This was a central question for 
Ackerknecht, Levi-Strauss and Turner. From their work we can discern some of the forms 
of the many different pathways that are to this day seen to enable symbolic efficacy – that 
is to say, its mechanisms of action. “The primitive treatment centres around symbolical 
actions, for the symbol is of enormous importance in primitive thought,” wrote Ackerknecht 
in a 1942 paper on the ‘Problems of primitive medicine’ (1971: 123). The primary function 
of the symbol, he and other anthropologists argued, was to make visible, concrete and 
material otherwise invisible forces, thereby making them amenable to manipulation and 
ultimately enabling cure. The primitive symbol is “concrete and material, and permits 
action by mystical participation upon invisible forces which it cannot attain otherwise”, 
primitive therapy “is partly a process of making hidden and secret things visible and 
thereby accessible, if they are harmful, to redressive and remedial action” and the primitive 
cure consists “in making explicit a situation originally existing on the emotional level and in 
rendering acceptable to the mind pains which the body refuses to tolerate” (Ackerknecht 
1971: 123-4; Lévi-Strauss 1968: 190; Turner 1967: 302-3). 
 
This active use of symbols to make explicit and concrete otherwise invisible, spiritual or 
emotional forces is the key to symbolic efficacy. The first, and most important, mechanism 
of action of symbolic efficacy relates to the concept of coping. Disease, it is often argued, 
is a disruptive life event, one that engenders considerable disorder, chaos and anxiety in 
the patient. The primary function of the witchdoctor, priest or sorcerer’s healing ritual, 
according to these medical anthropologists, was therefore to restore cognitive order – a 
kind of “bloodless, gutless” homeostasis to borrow Wilson’s (2004: 42) phrase – and 
thereby to calm the patient: 
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The medicine man is a soul doctor and his fellow primitive whom we know as 
an emotionalist needs him badly… His rigid system, which ignores doubt, 
dispels fear, restores confidence and inspires hope. And as Charcot said: the 
best inspirer of hope is the best physician. (Ackerknecht 1971: 130, my 
emphasis) 
 
Highlighting that a sorcerer’s healing ritual would often consist not only of medicinal herbs 
or other material implements but also a myth or narrative to go along with them, Claude 
Lévi-Strauss argued that “the technique of the narrative aims at recreating a real 
experience in which the myth merely shifts the protagonists” and therefore that “the 
efficacy of the cure would be jeopardized if, even before any results were to be expected, 
it failed to offer the sick woman a resolution, that is, a situation wherein all protagonists 
have resumed their places and returned to an order which is no longer threatened” (Lévi-
Strauss 1968: 194, 197). 
 
It is this process of restoring order that has been singled out as the key to coping in an 
anthropological sense and therefore to the mechanism of action of symbolic efficacy. 
Victor Turner, who meticulously documented the symbols used in various rituals by the 
Ndembu of Zambia in Forest of Symbols, argues that “out of the randomness and 
incoherence of the environment, the chimbuki [ritual specialist] selects certain items and 
arrays them in a coherent structure in accordance with his sensitivity to Ndembu 
evaluations and symbolism and in accordance with his intention of curing a specific, 
culturally defined disease” (Turner 1967: 351). And in a classic analysis of a Cuna 
woman’s birth ritual in a chapter on ‘The effectiveness of symbols’, Lévi-Strauss 
concludes: 
 
The tutelary spirits and malevolent spirits, the supernatural monsters and 
magical animals, are all part of a coherent system on which the native 
conception of the universe is founded. The sick woman accepts these mythical 
beings or, more accurately, she has never questioned their existence. What 
she does not accept are the incoherent and arbitrary pains, which are an alien 
element in her system but which the shaman, calling upon myth, will re-
integrate within a whole where everything is meaningful. (Lévi-Strauss 1968: 
197) 
 
Taking the sham out of placebo 
Now, as already pointed out, this pioneer ethnographic work was taking place at the same 
time as the placebo effect was becoming the object of systematised scientific investigation. 
In the preceding centuries, during what is sometimes referred to as the ‘golden age of 
quackery’ (see Holbrook 1959; Porter 1989; Wahlberg 2007b) where bad medicine was 
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particularly associated with hucksters and cranks accused of deliberately pretending 
spectacular claims for their snake oils and miracle cures, Kaptchuk (1998a) has shown 
how the blind assessment of a treatment emerged as a tool specifically designed for 
detecting fraud. These quacks were out to scam the public and by way of ingeniously 
designed blind trials, their game could be exposed. The appointment of a royal 
commission by King Louis XVI of France in 1784 to investigate the effects of animal 
magnetism claimed by Franz Anton Mesmer and his followers is often cited as a significant 
moment in the emergence of a new way to determine the purported efficacy of a treatment 
or remedy – that is, by comparing its effects with that of a sham treatment made 
practicable by blind-folding prospective treatment recipients and observing how they react 
to both verum and sham treatments (see Darnton 1968; Harrington 1997; 2006; Kaptchuk 
1998a). Importantly, in the final report of King Louis XVI’s royal commission, who had 
carried out a series of trials on a number of blind-folded subjects, Benjamin Franklin and 
his team of scientists concluded that any “sensations, real or pretended, were determined 
by the imagination” (cited in Darnton 1968: 62-5). Ever since, a role for the imagination, 
mind and later brain in generating therapeutic cures for what came to be considered 
essentially biophysical diseases, has been scientifically posited and vigorously studied. 
 
Even as a number of psychologists picked up on the role of “suggestion” in the eliciting of 
therapeutic effects towards the end of the 19th century, the contention remained that 
whatever the observed effects in patients these were deceptions, ‘tricks of the mind’, or 
even cases of conscious fraud on the part of a practitioner. It would not be until the early 
20th century that this vilification of the imagination as a deceiving healing agent would 
begin its gradual transformation into a recognised and acknowledged (if frustratingly so) 
therapeutic agent of almost all forms of treatment and medicine (Harrington 2006), 
eventually canonised as the ‘placebo effect’ in 1950 when pharmacologist Stewart Wolf of 
Cornell University Medical College concluded that “‘placebo effects’ which modify the 
pharmacologic action of drugs or endow inert agents with potency are not imaginary, but 
may be associated with measurable changes at the end organs” (Wolf 1950: 108, my 
emphasis). While historical studies of the placebo effect have done well to highlight the 
important role played by especially psychologists, neurologists and pharmacologists in the 
post-WWII emergence of the placebo effect as a legitimate object of scientific inquiry, the 
pivotal role of early medical anthropology in the conceptual recasting that has taken the 
sham out of placebo has been mostly overlooked.2 
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For many medical anthropologists, the symbolic restorations of cognitive order that they 
accounted for in their medical ethnographies did not necessarily remain in a bloodless, 
gutless domain of cognitive frameworks and lifeworlds. Instead, they also saw them as 
inciters of what we might think of as a ‘spill-over’ placebo effect. Notwithstanding the 
crucial role they attributed to symbolic restorations of order in healing processes in 
themselves, Ackerknecht, Levi-Strauss and Turner were also fully aware that a question 
remained as to whether this effect that they were describing was ‘merely’ a sophisticated 
account of what had long been known as “suggestion”. And there were two particular ways 
in which this question was tackled. First of all, they argued that the symbolic component of 
healing was by no means limited to the experiences of ‘primitive peoples’. Both 
Ackerknecht and Turner underlined that “suggestion is one of the major implements of 
[both] the shaman and of the M.D.”, “it must be admitted that medicine in our culture relies 
to a certain extent on suggestion…, the general practitioner in British rural areas 
administered ‘nasty’ medicines, partly on account of their curative properties and partly to 
satisfy the patient that they were ‘strong’ enough to ‘kill’ the ailment” (Ackerknecht 1971: 
161; Turner 1967: 315). Although, all things equal, both agreed with Rivers that there 
nevertheless were differences in the use of suggestion between primitive and modern 
medicine, but these were “only differences in degree” (Ackerknecht 1971: 161). 
Nevertheless, a question remained over whether effected cures remained in a subjective 
realm of coping or whether they also spilled over into a corporeal realm of biological 
regulation, much as psychosomatic disorders were seen to move from the psychogenic 
(incited by anxiety, stress, fear or trauma) to the somatic (manifest as heart irregularities, 
digestive disorders, asthma or skin conditions) (see Greco 1998; Wilson 2004). 
 
Turner argues that, in any case, “the distinction between ‘medicine’ as ‘drug’ and as ‘ritual 
symbol’ is a very fine one, and it is not always possible to make it clearly. All things are felt 
to be charged with powers of various kinds, and it is the job both of the herbalist and of the 
ritual specialist to manipulate these for the benefit of society” (1967: 335). Nevertheless, in 
reflecting over how Ndembu rituals had withstood the test of time, he concludes that in all 
likelihood there is not too much in the way of physiological cure that can be attributed 
directly to Ndembu healing rituals, rather, any physiological effects are attributable to spill-
over placebo efficacy: 
 
One reason for their persistence lies, no doubt, in the very fact that they are 
part of a religious system which itself constitutes an explanation of the 
universe and guarantees norms and values on which orderly social 
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arrangements rest… Another more practical reason would be that many 
diseases are self-curing; in the course of time, regardless of treatment they 
are given, many people recover from illness, but the recovery is attributed to 
the treatment. Then again, psychological considerations must play a part in 
the case of mild psychosomatic conditions and in milder cases of somatic 
illness. Such considerations would include the authoritative air of the doctor-
herbalist, the purposive structure of the procedure, the ‘shock treatment’ 
aspect mentioned above, and the sense that something traditional is being 
done about a known and named condition. Here we have an instance of the 
well-known placebo effect, where medicine is given to humour rather than to 
cure the patient, but where improvement in health nevertheless results. 
(Turner 1967: 356) 
 
Lévi-Strauss, on the other hand, is more adamant in arguing that “this term [psychological 
cure] will remain meaningless unless we can explain how specific psychological 
representations are invoked to combat equally specific physiological disturbances”, and 
that a healing ritual “constitutes a psychological manipulation of the sick organ, and it is 
precisely from this manipulation that a cure is expected” (1968: 191, 192), which suggests 
a definite physiological ‘spill-over’ effect. In more detailed terms: 
 
The shaman provides the sick woman with a language, by means of which 
unexpressed, and otherwise inexpressible, psychic states can be immediately 
expressed. And it is the transition to this verbal expression – at the same time 
making it possible to undergo in an ordered and intelligible form a real 
experience that would otherwise be chaotic and inexpressible – which induces 
the release of the physiological process, that is, the reorganization, in a 
favourable direction, of the process to which the sick woman is subjected. 
(Lévi-Strauss 1968: 198, my emphasis) 
 
In other words, just as psychogenic fear, trauma, anxiety or stress have been claimed to 
be generative of somatic disorders or even of ‘voodoo death’ via some kind of intermediate 
pathways, medical anthropologists have persistently argued that psychogenically induced 
hope, order, expectation or familiarity can be generative of somatic cure via similar, albeit 
reversed, intermediate pathways of psychosomatic mediation. 
  
To sum up, we should not overlook the important role that medical anthropology has had 
in positing a very real and concrete symbolic efficacy for all therapeutic encounters, 
irrespective of whether they have been classed as primitive, traditional, modern or 
alternative. Moreover, the anthropological recasting of an irrational, simple or superstitious 
‘primitive medicine’ into a very rational and complex ‘leechcraft’ has also played a key role 
in the relatively recent decriminalisation of placebo, by arguing for the possibility of a 
physiologically measurable spill-over placebo efficacy released by a concrete symbolic 
efficacy. If this symbolic efficacy is as real and concrete as they claim, then no longer is 
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the resulting placebo efficacy necessarily a case of deceptive suggestion or conscious 
fraud. Rather, according to medical anthropologists, the redressive restoration of cognitive 
order and hope in the face of the incoherence, randomness and chaos of disease – the 
mechanism of action of coping understood as a kind of symbolic homeostasis facilitated by 
“symbolic pathway[s] of words, feelings, values, expectations, beliefs, and the like” 
(Kleinman 1973: 210) – is a crucial, rational and material part of any healing process. To 
be sure, an unfinished and lively debate remains over the extent to which, as well as over 
the specific ways in which, this symbolic efficacy spills over via intermediate pathways into 
a physiological realm of bio-efficacy. Is it via a conditioned response based on cultural 
familiarity, a logic of expectation that releases endogenous pharmaceutics (such as the by 
now infamous endorphins), a hope-generated immunological boost that assists self-
healing, or does it indeed remain in the subjective realm as an abreaction-aided 
restoration of cognitive order which enhances the well-being of a patient?3 
 
The symbolic effectiveness of herbal medicine 
Now, as has been shown by a number of scholars, the post-WWII period has seen the rise 
of what is currently known as ‘evidence-based medicine’ (EBM) which has for the most 
part championed the randomised controlled trial as its most important tool for evaluating 
the effectiveness of a particular drug or therapy (Goodman 2003; Marks 1997; 
Timmermans and Berg 2003). While these studies have demonstrated the social, 
economic and ethical contexts in which EBM has emerged, the rationale for these 
developments can also be discerned in the conceptualisations of efficacy that I have 
described above. For, if there is a contention that pretty much any kind of treatment (‘even’ 
completely inert placebo treatments) will have some kind of positive effect on a patient, 
then it is no longer sufficient to be able to demonstrate that a new treatment ‘works’ when 
measured against certain treatment outcomes. Instead, to provide evidence of 
effectiveness, a new drug or therapy has to be shown to have an effect that is ‘above and 
beyond placebo’ which in turn calls for specific clinical testing techniques. Moreover, there 
is a clear assumption in the logic of clinical trials that the ‘specific effects’ of a drug (which 
it usually is) relate to its biological effects, i.e. the beneficial therapeutic effect that results 
when a drug is ingested, thereby becoming pharmacokinetically/–dynamically bio-available 
and affecting the physiological workings of the body (Lakoff 2005; 2007). 
 
The move towards clinical testing with the help of randomised controlled trials can certainly 
be identified in the recent history of what is often referred to as ‘Western herbal medicine’ 
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(as opposed to Chinese, Ayurvedic, Tibetan or indeed any other non-European or 
American form of herbal medicine) (Griggs 1997; Lewith, et al. 2002; Mills and Bone 
1999). Yet, however much focus, not to mention resources, have been directed towards 
determining the bio-efficacy of herbal medicines in recent years, this shift has definitely not 
come at the cost of other forms of efficacy. In the United Kingdom, for example, 
indigenous herbal medicine is described by herbalists both in terms of a particular (or 
alternative) ‘way of thinking’ about health and healing (often described as “holistic”), and in 
terms of physiological effects in “certain organs or systems of the body” during the course 
of a treatment (NIMH 2004). That is to say, the efficacy of herbal medicines is accounted 
for through both symbolic and physiological mechanisms of action. 
 
On the symbolic side, as put by herbalist Simon Mills in his Essential Book of Herbal 
Medicine, herbal medicine is about offering patients “imagery and models of their illness 
that they can relate to”, as well as forming a “common language allowing patient and 
physician to understand each other better” (1993: 21, 32). And it is exactly here that herbal 
medicine is seen to have an advantage over modern medicine which herbalist Michael 
McIntyre suggests has “lost sight of the human beings who are ill, and of the subtle 
emotional, mental and physical factors that can determine whether a person is ill” 
(McIntyre 1988: 31). Hence, the patient’s active participation in the healing process is 
highlighted as crucial by herbalists. Holistic herbal healing is far from being only about 
taking herbal remedies for different symptoms or conditions, rather the healing process 
involves engaging patients and assisting them to understand that their lifestyle – including 
aspects of diet, stress, exercise, etc. – is the key to active maintenance of balance, 
harmony and thereby health. 
 
Yet, to suggest that the efficacy of herbal medicine in Britain is confined to a symbolic 
realm, that restores cognitive order to a patient by allowing him or her to understand the 
underlying cause of imbalances and disharmonies, would be to neglect a central tenet of 
western herbal medicine, i.e. helping the body to help itself by strengthening its own vis 
medicatrix naturae or innate self-healing abilities. As put by Mills: 
 
the modern herbalist does not claim descent from the shaman... It is, of 
course, always the case that the therapist powerfully influences the therapy, 
but as in other crafts it is the nature of the material, the character of the 
remedies, that is the determining factor (1993: 150). 
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At a consultation, a herbalist will seek to identify the “underlying cause of the problem... 
which is [what is] treated, rather than the symptoms alone [as] treatment or suppression of 
symptoms will not rid the body of the disease itself” (NIMH 2004). To do so “the Herbalist 
will take notes on the patient’s medical history and begin to build a picture of the person as 
a whole being” (ibid.). Only then will treatment be recommended and, as described by the 
National Institute of Medical Herbalists (NIMH), herbal remedies are themselves ‘merely’: 
 
used to ‘feed’ and restore to health those parts which have become 
weakened... Treatment may [also] include advice about diet and lifestyle as 
well as the herbal medicine. As the body is strengthened so is its power and 
ability to fight off disease and when balance and harmony are restored, health 
will be regained. [Hence], healing is a matter of teamwork with patient, 
practitioner and the prescribed treatment all working together to restore the 
body to health. (ibid.) 
 
In other words, the role of the Western herbalist is to facilitate the restoration of any 
imbalances or disharmonies (often seen as resulting from disobliging lifestyles), by, on the 
hand providing patients with “imagery and models of their illness that they can relate to” 
and on the other “herbs that can re-establish or revive the harmonious flow of [a] universal 
life force, without which we die” (McIntyre 1988: 42). 
 
Notwithstanding the crucial emphasis of herbalists on lifestyle and patient understanding in 
herbal healing encounters, as already mentioned, in recent years, a growing body of 
research throughout the world has begun documenting the extent of the “independent 
activity of the herbs themselves” through clinical trials, phytochemical elucidation and 
pharmacological laboratory research (Mills and Bone 1999: xviii). This aspect of western 
herbal medicine is increasingly referred to as ‘rational phytotherapy’, or the science of 
herbal medicine. Western herbalists have in recent decades been slated “for clinging to 
outworn historical authority and for not assessing their drugs in terms of today’s 
knowledge” (Department of Health cited in British Medical Association. Board of Science 
and Education. 1986: 110), and what many see as an increasing rationalisation of western 
herbal medicine could well be seen as a concrete response to these kinds of charges. The 
number of herbal medicines being clinically tested for efficacy is growing by the day, 
something not unrelated to what herbalist Andrew Chevallier has described as “justified… 
scepticism about claims for new ‘wonder’ treatments” (1999: 36). 
 
St. John’s Wort and the psychometrics of depression 
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One such herbal remedy is St. John’s Wort (hypericum perforatum). Records of its 
medicinal uses date back to Theophrastus (373-287 BC), Pliny (23-79 AD) and Dioscordes 
(40-90 AD) who recommended it for burns, snakebites and as a diuretic. But it was not 
until the 16th century that the first references to its current use as an “arnica for the nerves” 
can be found, when Paracelsus (1493-1541) recommended it for not just wounds and 
parasites, but also for what he called ‘phantasmata’ (see Müller 2005). A century later, in 
1630, Italian iatrochemist Angelo Sala reported that: 
 
St. John’s Wort has a curious, excellent reputation for the treatment of 
illnesses of the imagination… and for the treatment of melancholia, anxiety 
and disturbances of understanding… With the same power it works against 
the symptoms caused by witches (cited in Rosenthal 1998: 197). 
 
During the ‘golden age of quackery’, the effectiveness of St. John’s Wort in treating 
“illnesses of the imagination” was accounted for in a few different ways. Ascribing to 
astrological explanations as well as to the doctrine of signatures, Nicholas Culpeper 
classed the very yellow-flowering St. John’s Wort “under the celestial sign Leo, and the 
dominion of the Sun” in his English Physitian (1652), while Robert John Thornton 
explained in his Family Herbal (1814) how “formerly it was supposed, and not without 
reason, that madmen were possessed of the devil, and this plant was found so successful 
in that disorder, that it had the title Fuga daemonum, as curing demoniacs” (cited in 
Rosenthal 1998: 202). Indeed, Rosenthal has shown how accounts of the powers of St. 
John’s Wort to ward off spirits, chase away the devil, or overcome witchcraft were 
“rampant throughout Europe and the British Isles” during these centuries (1998: 203). 
 
Such explanations have of course long since come to be dismissed as the superstitions 
and old wives’ tales of ‘backward’ people. Instead, the search for evidence of effectiveness 
has been relocated to the laboratories of phytochemists and the clinics of clinical triallists. 
In recent decades, St. John’s Wort (together with garlic (allium sativum) and ginkgo 
(ginkgo biloba)) has become one of the most clinically studied plants in the world.4 The 
beginnings of this clinical interest can be traced to December 1984, when the German 
Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices published the first of 360 medicinal herb 
monographs based on extensive bibliographic reviews. Among these was a monograph for 
the well-known German folk remedy plant johanniskraut. While there was little clinical data 
available at the time on St. John’s Wort, an otherwise long bibliographic reference trail led 
so-called ‘Commission E’5 (made up of 24 physicians, pharmacists, non-biomedical 
practitioners, pharmacologists, toxicologists and biostatisticians) to list “psychovegetative 
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disturbances, depressive moods, anxiety and/or nervous unrest” as possible treatment 
uses for it, as well as to note that “a mild antidepressant action of the herb and its 
preparations has been observed and reported by numerous physicians” (Heilpflanzen-Welt 
2005). 
 
By the mid 1990s, over 30 clinical trials (many of them funded by German herbal remedy 
producer, Lichtwer Pharma) had been carried out on extracts of johanniskraut which had 
at the same time become the single most prescribed antidepressant in Germany; making 
up as much as 25% of all prescriptions for antidepressants and pushing sales of Lichtwer 
Pharma’s St. John’s Wort extracts from $23 million in 1994 to $66 million in 1996 (Müller 
2005: 2; Nash and Cray 1997). It was also around this time that Linde and colleagues 
(1996) would carry out the first meta-analysis of those clinical trials that had compared the 
efficacy of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of depression against either placebo or 
standard antidepressant treatments. Based on these inclusion criteria, Linde and 
colleagues analysed 23 out of 37 identified trials, concluding that “there is evidence that 
extracts of hypericum are more effective than placebo for the treatment of mild to 
moderately severe depressive disorders” (1996: 253). While use of St. John’s Wort had 
been growing steadily in Germany since 1984, it was this meta-analysis published in the 
British Medical Journal, together with some of the first pre-clinical study results on possible 
pharmacological antidepressant mechanisms of action published in 1997 and 1998 
Pharmacopsychiatry supplements (Muller 1998; Muller and Kasper 1997), that would re-
introduce St. John’s Wort to the English-speaking world. In 1997, a flurry of media stories 
suggested that St. John’s Wort might be “Nature’s Prozac”, citing the recently published 
clinical and pre-clinical research (see Andrews 1997; Hicks 1997; Johnson, et al. 1997; 
Nash and Cray 1997). And the effect of this media storm was tangible as St. John’s Wort 
virtually overnight transformed into one of the world’s first herbal ‘blockbusters’ throughout 
Europe and America, notwithstanding persistent reminders from herbal practitioners that 
hypericum has a much wider use and is most often used by herbalists as one element of a 
holistic ‘polypharmacy’ approach (Chevallier 1999: 12, 91).6 
 
Today, two decades after Commission E’s monograph was first published, extracts of St. 
John’s Wort remain a popular treatment for especially mild depression, and there is no 
sign that clinical interest is abating.7 At the same time, it cannot be said that a clear 
consensus has emerged as to the therapeutic merits of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of 
depression, a point further exacerbated by controversies surrounding the ‘specificity’ of 
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depression as a disease (see Healy 2004; Lakoff 2005). Debates have centred around five 
specific concerns: the possibility that St. John’s Wort extract can negatively interact with 
other commonly used drugs; the drastically varied quality of extracts available to 
unknowing consumers; pharmacologic debates over which of the many active ingredients 
found in St. John’s Wort extract (if any) are responsible for antidepressant activity (which 
has bearing on extract standardisation and quality control of products); disputes over 
whether St. John’s Wort is only effective in cases of mild depression as opposed to 
moderate and major depression;8 and finally, whether it is more effective than standard 
antidepressants. On the other hand, it is widely agreed that St. John’s Wort has a much 
better safety profile than pharmaceutical antidepressants, although concerns about 
negative drug interactions and low quality extracts have certainly troubled this consensus 
to some extent. 
 
Notwithstanding these various important clinical debates, what is clear from the past two 
decades’ worth of clinical literature on St. John’s Wort is the pivotal role that standardised 
diagnostic criteria, rating scales and clinical outcome measures have played in efforts to 
confirm or dismiss its claims to efficacy. Clinical efficacy is simply not feasible without this 
infrastructure. The many clinicians who over the past years have studied the 
antidepressant efficacy claims of St. John’s Wort have had to build up psychological and 
physiological templates of healing (cf. Triantafillou and Moreira 2005) as a prerequisite for 
quantifying clinical observations into recordable and visualisable clinical outcomes. And, 
since depression has been the object of clinical study since the 1960s, a lot of this work 
had already been done for them. For example, Max Hamilton famously designed the first 
“rating scale for depression” in 1960 (now known as the Hamilton Depression Rating Scale 
or HAM-D) followed by Aaron Beck who developed his “inventory for measuring 
depression” in 1961 (now known as the Beck Depression Inventory or BDI), to mention the 
most famous ones. 
 
While it is normal for trial protocols to include up to four or five different rating scales,9 the 
HAM-D has emerged as the “gold standard” for the clinical assessment of depression in 
general (Bagby, et al. 2004). The HAM-D is a quantifiable depression scale that allows 
clinicians to rate the intensity of depression (absent, mild, moderate or severe) that a 
patient is suffering from at any given time. A clinical trial protocol will specify diagnostic 
criteria (for patient inclusion), length of observation period, rating scales to be used as well 
as the number of times a trial subject’s level of depression is to be measured. The HAM-D 
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is a so-called “observer-rated” scale meaning that it is the clinician rather than the patient 
who carries out the rating – although it would perhaps be more accurate to describe it as 
an elicitor-rated scale, since scoring on the bulk of the 17 indicators that make up the 
HAM-D questionnaire relies on the trial participant “indicating”, “communicating”, 
“expressing” or “agreeing on” symptoms of depression such as “guilt feelings”, “lack of 
motivation”, “anxiety” or “irritability”, often after prompting by the clinician.10 Even the 
somatic or physiological indicators on the HAM-D scale rely largely on the subjective 
accounts of the trial participant regarding, for example, “feelings of fatigue”, “abdominal 
symptom experiences”, “insomnia” or “gastro-intestinal complaints”. The few indicators that 
are observed without elicitation by the clinician are “non-verbal communications”, such as 
agitation and retardation as well as “estimations of weight loss”. 
 
Once each of the 17 indicators has been evaluated by the clinician, a trial subject can be 
given a total score out of a maximum of 52. These total scores can then be monitored over 
time at periodic intervals, tabulated and eventually graphed. And while there is no 
universal agreement on what each score signifies, there is a tendency to grade scores in 
the low 10s as mild, the high 10s as mild to moderate, and the 20s as moderate to 
severe.11 For a treatment to be considered efficacious in the treatment of depression, it 
has to demonstrate a reduction in HAM-D scores that is greater than reductions 
experienced by trial subjects receiving placebo to a statistically significant degree. 
 
It is crucial to point out just how significant a role the infamous placebo effect has played in 
clinical trials investigating the efficacy of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of depression.12 
Put in simple terms, just as has been the case in standard antidepressant trials, patients 
who are given a placebo rather than St. John’s Wort get significantly better during the 
course of a clinical trial. For example, in Sommer and Harrer’s (1994) double-blind, 
placebo-controlled trial of the efficacy of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of mildly 
depressed patients, the mean reduction in HAM-D scores of the 42 patients receiving St. 
John’s Wort was -9 points compared to -5 points for those who received placebos (both 
from a baseline of 16) after 4 weeks of treatment. In Hansgen et al.’s (1994) multicentre, 
double-blind trial of the efficacy of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of major depression, 
the mean reduction in HAM-D scores of the 33 patients receiving St. John’s Wort was -13 
points (from a baseline of 22), compared to -6 points (from a baseline of 20) for those who 
received placebos after 4 weeks of treatment. In Lecrubier et al.’s (2002) double-blind, 
placebo-controlled trial of the efficacy of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of major 
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depression, the mean reduction in HAM-D scores of the 186 patients who received St. 
John’s Wort was -10 points compared to -8 points for those who received a placebo after 
42 days (both from a baseline of 22). And finally, in Shelton et al.’s (2001) randomized 
controlled trial on the effectiveness of St. John’s Wort in the treatment of major depression, 
the mean reduction in HAM-D scores was -7 points (from a baseline of 22) for those who 
received St. John’s Wort, and -6 points (from a baseline of 23) for those who received a 
placebo after 8 weeks. 
 
Now, while it would be far too simplistic to conclude something like ‘at least 50%’ of the 
efficacy of St. John’s Wort is due to the placebo effect, it is nevertheless important to 
understand that when it comes to treating depression with St. John’s Wort (or any other 
antidepressant for that matter) there is a lot more going on than bio-pharmacological 
activity.13 Indeed, as was discussed earlier, randomised controlled trials have emerged out 
of a need to demonstrate an efficacy that is ‘above and beyond placebo’, and are rooted in 
a relatively recent positing of inevitable and measurable treatment effects (detectable “at 
the end organs”) which are not specific to the medicine or treatment under trial. As the 
argument goes, even in the controlled settings of a clinical trial, “non-specific” effects 
resulting from an authoritative clinician-trial subject relationship, expectation on the part of 
the patient, the act of self-rating, or being interviewed periodically by a clinician are 
inevitable. That is to say, it is suggested that the clinical trial itself – in much the same way 
that a consultation with a GP or herbalist might – can generate symbolic efficacy in clinical 
trial participants which may then spill-over into measurable outcomes. 
 
Moreover, it is also argued that further to taking part in a clinical trial, a patient may also be 
actively reading up on what has become a burgeoning St. John’s Wort self-help literature 
(e.g. Knishinsky 1998; Rosenthal 1998; Zuess 1997) in which lifestyle changes and an 
active approach to getting better are encouraged. These books provide readers with 
cognitive meaning frameworks as a concrete coping technique in itself in chapters with 
titles such as “Understanding Depression”, “Hypericum – Herbal Anti-Depressant” and 
“What is Depression?”. They are written for “people of all ages who are trying to cope with 
short or long-term problems” and encourage them to place their suffering within a holistic 
context of “medical, dietary and emotional history and lifestyle” (Great Britain. Mind. 2004: 
9). Such activity by trial subjects, it is argued, may also contribute to any efficacy attributed 
to St. John’s Wort through clinical trials, although ‘non-specifically’ so. And finally, it is also 
pointed out that it cannot be excluded that the “natural history” or “self-limiting nature” of a 
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condition such as depression in some patients mean that they ‘would have gotten better 
anyway’ with or without treatment (see Kaptchuk 1998b; Kirsch and Sapirstein 1998). 
 
It is in these different ways that bio-efficacy, placebo efficacy and symbolic efficacy 
circulate in efforts to clinically test St. John’s Wort in the treatment of depression. In the 
particular case of depression, a further confounding factor arises from the fact that even if 
depression has in recent years acquired some kind of a (albeit highly contested) 
neurochemical-pathway-facilitated physiological base (Healy 2004; Rose 2000), 
assessments of a drug treatment’s efficacy are most often reliant on a patient’s subjective 
recounting of any self-perceived therapeutic change, although brain-imaging has also 
recently been employed in efforts to make depression visualisable and measurable 
(Wilson 2006). That is to say, it is not serotonin, dopamine, noradrenaline or glutamate 
levels that are measured over time to demonstrate efficacy in humans, rather it is a 
patient’s symptomatic experiences (as reported by him or herself) of helplessness, guilt 
and insufficiency that are recorded, quantified and monitored over time. So there is an 
inbuilt tension (not unlike that found in debates over the placebo effect) in clinical trials 
between bloodless, gutless theories of cognition on the one hand, and neurological, ‘end 
organ’ theories on the other (see also Lakoff 2005). This tension is particularly relevant in 
cases of chronic disease (such as depression or back pain) where improving quality of life 
is much more the therapeutic objective than increasing longevity, even if this latter 
objective can also play a significant part in treatment considerations. With acutely life-
threatening conditions (e.g. many forms of cancer) “survival is the gold standard by which 
[treatments] are judged” (Edwards cited in BBC News Online 2006).14 
 
Are the “observer-rated” feelings of depression trial subjects symptomatic manifestations 
of essentially bio-physiological disturbances as suggested by ‘pre-clinical’ pharmacological 
studies of antidepressant mechanisms of action, or are they symptomatic utterances 
resulting from essentially non-physiological, affective disorders? Whatever the case, it is 
clear that assessments of efficacy in depression treatment trials with human subjects 
today rely primarily on the ‘objective’ quantification of a range of ‘subjective’ indicators. 
 
Conclusion 
In this paper, it has been my intention to demonstrate the many and often overlapping 
assumptions that have arisen over the past century or so out of persistent and stubborn 
attendance to the central therapeutic question of “does it work?”, using herbal medicine as 
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an example. What I have argued is that concepts of efficacy are dependent on the objects 
to which they refer/describe. By distinguishing between the bloodless, gutless symbolic 
efficacy that medical anthropologists – who take human subjectivity as their primary object 
– have meticulously sought to describe in their ethnographic accounts of healing rituals on 
the one hand, and the physiological bio-efficacy that clinicians and pharmacologists – who 
take human somatic biology as their primary object – have equally painstakingly sought to 
document through in vivo, in vitro and clinical experimentation on the other, I have shown 
how a decriminalised placebo effect has emerged as a possible intermediate link between 
the two. For, the placebo effect relies at one and the same time on both symbolic (hope, 
expectation, cognitive homeostasis, familiarity, etc.) and physiological (end organ 
normalisation) concepts of efficacy. The intermediate pathways that link the symbolic and 
the somatic facilitate both cure and pathology, with stress, anxiety or fear potentially 
leading to physiologically manifest psychosomatic disorders, and their opposites in hope, 
expectation and ‘peace of mind’ potentially generating physiologically therapeutic 
(placebo) effects. They also allow for the reverse, as somatic manifestations of disease 
are seen to generate anxiety and fear while somatic improvements can generate hope and 
expectation. The spill-over placebo effect then hangs comfortably somewhere in between 
the somatic and the symbolic – its effects biological (measurable at the end organs by 
pharmacologists), its preconditions symbolic (localised in human subjectivity by 
anthropologists). 
 
And so it is somewhere within this complex of inter-crossing pathways which can be 
symbolic, physiological or somehow intermediary, that assurances of efficacy are sought 
after by anthropologists, clinicians, herbalists and pharmacologists alike. What should be 
clear from the experiences with St. John’s Wort that I have recounted here, is that even 
after a battery of observational studies, clinical trials and meta-analyses, answers to the 
question of whether a therapy or medicine ‘works’ are far from simple and clear-cut, 
especially when dealing with chronic conditions where improvement is measured 
‘subjectively’.15 If herbalists have been keen to keep the different forms of efficacy together 
in a ‘holistic’ approach to healing in their practice, the randomised controlled trial in its 
current form has, in contrast, sought to separate out what is seen as the “specific” efficacy 
of a treatment or remedy (an efficacy that is directly dependent on that treatment or 
remedy and nothing else, e.g. the “independent activity of the herbs themselves”), as 
opposed to “non-specific” efficacy which is often seen as arising in good part from the 
symbolic efficacy that participation in a clinical trial will invariably generate. Yet, the role of 
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blinding and the use of placebo or ‘sham’ treatments as comparisons is not so much for 
the immediate purpose of exposing a fraud, but rather more for determining whether or not 
a treatment or remedy has an efficacy that is “above and beyond” the efficacy that almost 
any healing intervention will generate. 
 
Nevertheless, following Wilson (2006), we might say that herbal medicine ‘works’ not in 
spite of but rather in active collaboration with the placebo; ‘true drug effect’, ‘placebo effect’ 
and ‘symbolic effect’ are in some ways inseparable. Even if randomised controlled trials 
explicitly seek to parcel out and quantify these different forms of response for the purposes 
of auditing its (non-)efficacy, they are never eliminated, hence the need for a standard of 
‘above and beyond placebo’. Indeed each are seen to contribute to a drug or treatment’s 
‘total effect’ and thereby to a patient’s self-reported experience of ‘getting better’, however 
non-specific placebo and symbolic effects are considered. 
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Research for this article was made possible by an internationalisation grant (No. 644-03-
0005) from the Danish Research Agency. My thanks to Linsey McGoey as well as four 
anonymous reviewers for valuable comments. 
 
                                               
1
 Indeed, Evans-Pritchard made a point of underlining that it was his Zande informants themselves who had 
pointed out the ‘trickery’ of many of their witchdoctors to him, but also that there were “a few entirely reliable 
practitioners” (1937: 185). 
2
 Both Harrington (1997) and Lakoff (2007) have reminded us of the importance of medical anthropology in 
the history of the placebo effect, but this has not been the focus of their work. Harrington does not go further 
back than the 1980s and Lakoff makes reference to Levi-Strauss. 
3
 See Harrington (1997) for a collection of essays that make their various cases on these points. 
4
 A simple PubMed clinical trial-related search gave 109 articles for ‘allium’, 195 for ‘ginkgo’ and 116 for 
‘hypericum’. See also American Botanical Council (1999). 
5
 A commission that had been established by the German Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices 
following the passing of Germany’s Second Medicines Act in 1976 to review the safety and efficacy of 
‘phytomedicines’ available on the German market. 
6
 The sales figures for the US market were spectacular in the final years of the 1990s, with some estimates 
suggesting that sales jumped 190% from $48 million in 1997 to $140 million in 1998. In Europe, sales figures 
for 1998 have been estimated at $6 billion. And in Britain, an estimated 2 million people were using St. 
John’s Wort in 2000. Ironically enough, increased attention to St. John’s Wort also resulted in a number of 
media reports suggesting that St. John’s Wort negatively interacted with a number of commonly used 
conventional drugs, which resulted in an almost immediate sales decline in Europe and America (Blumenthal 
1999; Kelly 2001; Lawson 2000). 
7
 An updated meta-analysis by Linde et al. from 2005 identified a total of 68 randomised or possibly 
randomised trials with St. John’s Wort (Linde, et al. 2005). 
8
 See, for example, Davidson et al. (2002) for a review of a large, double blind randomised controlled trial 
which did not find St. John’s Wort more effective than placebo in the treatment of major depression. 
9
 At least 19 different scales were used in those trials included in the meta-analysis by Linde et al. (2006) 
including the HAM-D, BDI, Patient's Global Assessment Scale, Adjective Mood Scale and Global 
Assessment of Functioning. 
10
 Further to such “observer-rated” scales as the HAM-D or the Clinical Global Impression Index, a number of 
self-rating scales for depression have also been developed which typically present trial participants with a 
number of statements, such as “I feel down-hearted and blue”, “I have crying spells” or “I still enjoy sex”, to 
which they have to indicate a little, some, good part or most of the time. These answers are then tabulated 
into total scores and can be monitored over time. 
11
 These categorisations, it turns out, have come to be crucial in debates over the efficacy of St. John’s Wort 
extracts, as clinical trials that have suggested an efficacy that is not superior to placebo in trials targeting 
patients suffering from moderate to severe depression (especially Davidson, et al. 2002) have not silenced 
proponents of St. John’s Wort as a “mild antidepressant”. 
12
 For debates about this in the context of SSRIs see Kirsch et al. (2002), Healy (2004) and Wilson (2006). 
13
 In a meta-analysis of 19 double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trials of standard anti-depressants, Kirsch 
and Sapirstein (1998) controversially argued that “inactive placebos produced improvement that was 75% of 
the effect of the active drug”, and consequently that “approximately one quarter of the drug response is due 
to the administration of an active medication, one half is a placebo effect, and the remaining quarter is due to 
other nonspecific factors”. While their article has been subject to considerable methodological critique, their 
point concerning the significant role that “placebo response” plays in overall treatment is relevant 
nonetheless (see also Kirsch, et al. 2002). 
14
 This is a crucial point in the context of complementary and alternative medicines such as herbal medicine 
with some herbalists themselves arguing that “modern patients with a life-threatening pathology are in much 
better hands with a modern physician than they could have been with any from earlier generations” or that 
“the value of modern medicine in coping with acute or life-threatening disease is plain to see” (McIntyre 
1988: 30; Mills 1993: 20). 
15
 This latter point is just as relevant when it comes to standard antidepressants (Kirsch 2003; Kirsch, et al. 
2002). Archie Cochrane, considered by many to be the ‘father’ of evidence-based medicine, was acutely 
aware of this challenge: “There are other limitations on the general applicability of the randomised controlled 
trial. One important area is the group of diseases where improvement or deterioration has to be measured 
subjectively” (Cochrane 1972: 24). 
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